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Popa, some analogies break down sooner than others.
I don’t think it’s fair to say that it’s “yaduah” that the Raavad misunderstood the Rambam. As a Rishon who wrote a pirush on the Rambam, he probably understood it better than anyone else of his generation, kal vachomer anyone of our generation.
The fact that the Rambam explained it more in Moreh Nevuchim does not negate the Raavad’s problem with the Rambam: namely, that he felt the Rambam’s explanation did not sufficiently answer the question, and therefore the Rambam should not have brought it up at all.
The Raavad says “v’chol zeh einenu shoveh li” about his own pshat too; so his problem is not with the Rambam’s terutz per se, rather that since this question is so hard to answer (and admittedly they do have different approaches), the Rambam should not have brought it up, and the Raavad only wrote his own approach because the Rambam brought up the subject.
LAB: The Ra’avad wouldn’t have brought it up because he did not have a satisfactory answer. However, it is very clear from the first line of that Ra’avad that the Ra’avad thought the Rambam was saying that we can’t know the answer. That’s not what the Rambam said.
Sam, that’s not what the Ra’avad said.
Truth is that the Rambam actually writes that the answer is long and complicated, although he mentions that Yesod that Hashem’s knowledge is not acquired like ours is, and that we can’t ask the question as long as we know that we don’t grasp the concept.
DY: Really? How do you read it? He starts by saying that it’s not the way of Chachamim to ask questions [in Ikkarei Emunah] and then not answer them. He clearly thought the Rambam said he didn’t (can’t) know the answer.
???? ??? ????? ???? ??? ??? ??????? does not translate to “to ask questions and then not answer them”, rather, it means to start something and not know how to finish it.
The Rambam’s answer was that it’s not comprehensible to the human mind, and the Ra’avad didn’t feel that it was worthwhile, therefore, to bring up the subject. That’s how I understand the Ra’vad (that disclaimer is a bit superfluous considering my screen name).
DY: That was not the Rambam’s answer. That was how the Ra’avad understood the Rambam. But that’s not what the Rambam meant. Which is why I said that this is the most misunderstood Rambam ever.
How do you understand ??? ??? ?? ???? ???? ??? ???”? ?? ??????? ????????
The Ramba”m puts His yediah in the realm of His atzmus and says that we have no concept of it.
In the realm of the briah, the idea is a stirah, and since we live in the briah, for us it is an incomplete answer.
DaasShnayim: I understood the Rambam the sameway you did. He begins by saying that the answer is longer than measurable land and vaster than the sea, so he obviously never intended for the reader to think that he was attempting to answer the question fully. Additionally, he says that the answer hinges on understanding how the Ribono Shel Olam’s daas works, which he then says is incomprehensible to us humans. So he clearly was simply writing enough on the subject to give the reader an idea of what the general concept of the answer is.
The Raavad was arguing with the Rambam’s approach, as he believed that one should not bring up a question unless a complete answer is given (Hence ??? ??? ???????).
DaasShnayim
I asked for that, didn’t I? 🙂
I actually liked Popa’s pizza analogy.
Imagine it like this: Suppose you are a professional chef making chicago style deep dish pizza in cast iron skillets. You know how to make the recipe, and you know based on how you make each recipe how it is going to turn out differently. And you make each one the way that you intend for it to turn out. And it certainly does turn out that way.
Until a lightning bolt strikes your Pizza oven for comparing God to a pizza maker. Then it doesn’t turn out quite the way you expected.
🙂
Lab: You should have brought the Ramabam in Yesodei HaTorah. I believe it is more detailed (and a very interesting take on the whole question).
I actually liked Popa’s pizza analogy.
I thought it was stupid
gavra_at_work – IIRC he doesn’t specifically address this question there. I also found it harder to understand. Either way, the Rambam in Teshuvah mentions that one.
I thought Popa’s pizza analogy was brilliant.
LAB: Read it again with the question in mind.
I probably would have preferred popa’s pizza to the analogy.
http://www.theyeshivaworld.com/coffeeroom/topic/popas-pizza-by-aurora77
This is actually a classic case of Ha Lan Ha Lehu. For the crowd that the Rambam is addressing it wouldn’t suffice not to bring it up, and for those with whom the Raavad associated there is no reason to introduce these patterns of Chakira.
As an aside, the Rambam mentions that the full answer is long and complex with many introductions. At least part of getting the fuller picture is understanding the concept of time being a self contained created reality. This comes with a slew of new questions that have to be addressed. It requires another way of thinking. This is why the Rambam says here that although he can’t get into the whole thing, just keep in mind the punchline, that questions about knowledge are based on our understanding of knowledge and in actuality this does not apply to HKBH.
Put it this way, the conundrum of Parah Adumah doesn’t really eat me up since I really understand Tumah in the first place. Perhaps if I would know what Tumah is all about, and why and how the Parah gets rid of it, the question of Metamei Es Hatehorim would fall away.
Here too, we know that we don’t understand how Hashem knows the future (I mean, He’s not a Navi) and we can’t even define what His knowledge really is, either. Therefore, questions about things that you don’t comprehend don’t apply.
I think I can improve on the Pizza analogy. Here is the concept behind the pizza analogy:
“There are many different paths to the future. Hashem knows where we will end up and which path we will take. We don’t know where we will end up. We may deviate from the correct path for us and end up with a different future. Does this make sense? “
A better analogy might be playing chess against a grandmaster. You can move the pieces any way you chose, but the outcome is known in advance. (You are going to lose.)
If we make the game more complicated to reflect the reality of how complex our world is, then the answer becomes clearer.
Now imagine that you are playing three dimensional chess with a cube shaped chess “board”. Imagine further that since there are six sides to this chess “board”, you are playing against 5 other people – each of them with their own set of pieces. Most humans would not be able to see one move ahead. Imagine that one of the players can analyze the position of each player and see the consequences of all players moves and counter-moves five moves ahead. That player is going to decide the outcome, even though each of the other five players is free to move his pieces any way he chooses.
I have found that most people find this analogy satisfying enough to allow them to move on. I hope it does the same for you, RationalFrummie.
TBT: That is not Yediyah. Even if the grandmaster knows the ultimate outcome, not knowing what move will be made next by any individual is a chisaron in the chess player’s Yediyas HaAsid.
That might address the earlier issue the Rambam brought up — Hechrach and Bechira. The world is complex enough and HKBH gets His way at the end.
gavra_at_work – I know, I know the Rambam. He just doesn’t ASK the question there, as he does in Teshuvah.
gavra_at_work: You are right. That is one of the many problems with this analogy. Nonetheless it works for most people because it is an example of knowing a result in advance while keeping free will intact.
The real answer to your question is to forget about analogies and learn the Meforshim. As other people have pointed out it is a long, complicated Sugya and doesn’t lend itself to a coffee room discussion. Nonetheless, I’ll give you something to chew on, but it really isn’t an answer.
When you look at Rav Dessler’s discussion of free will, you see that he talks about a war where the battle line moves after each battle. If there is true free will during the battle and the Nekuda of free will can change as a result of the battle, then it follows that Hashem’s will is CONDITIONAL. In other words, Hashem says if you succeed in this battle, then you will advance into enemy territory. If you fail, the enemy will advance while you retreat. But either way, the next battle could be in one of two different places. Going back to the chess analogy, this means that Hashem’s Yedia is that he can see all of the possible moves you can make and all of the possible counter moves he can make all the way to the end of the game. It is not that he knows in advance what you will do.
The problem with this idea is that in fact Hashem does know in advance what you will do. However, for the purpose of illustrating the concept of Hashem’s conditional will, the analogy is a good analogy.
The “game” of life is played on a “board” that has sequential moves where time is our greatest gift. Beings that aren’t physical can exist above time and this means they know the future and therefore can’t have free will. We however, do not know the future and therefore we can be rewarded or punished based on our sequence of “moves”. I agree that for understanding this point, the chess analogy is completely useless. If you think of an analogy for explaining this point, please post it.
TrueBT: Bimchilas K’vodcha, that’s why it’s an awful analogy. Because it’s not true. Some Rishonim do say like that; that Hashem’s knowledge is limited/Hashem limits his own knowledge in order to preserve out Bechira. That would be what makes the most sense to me. Unfortunately, most of the Rabbonim I have asked have said that it is absolute K’fira. So it’s not right.
Giving an analogy that settles people’s minds but it Apikorsus is a bad idea on so many levels. Your analogy hurts more than it helps.
I think the chess analogy can be improved upon. Think about a grandmaster who can anticipate moves AND also happens to know your intentions as you are thinking them AND knows (well actually creates)the future. Pretty much like a brain inside your brain.
Hudi, there’s no more bechirah in choosing a chess move than a candy flavor.
No analogy can change the fact that absolute knowledge cannot exist in the same realm as free choice.
I keep hearing that but it makes no sense to me. I still see no contradiction.
DaasYochid – The grandmaster is not choosing the moves of the opponent (us). He is anticipating moves and watching the mind of the opponent as he thinks of possible moves and makes those moves. Although the grandmaster (who is not your regular chess player, as you can see by now) has the power to cause the opponent to move in a certain way and either win or lose the game, he “steps back” so to speak and allows the opponent to make his own moves. Hashem has clear knowledge of our present and future choices. He can see and indeed allows into being the cascade of events that result from our single action/choice. Hashem is beyond time. Past, present, and future are one to Him. Hashem does not generally prevent us from moving in a certain direction, although He certainly can. The world is set up with cause and effect and is a world of tevah. Built into the structure of the universe are results for actions. Gravity is a clear example. Drop the apple and it falls. I think this can be applied on a microcosmic level, even to the level of the subtleties of human interaction. The famous question is..Can Hashem create a stone that is too heavy for Him to lift. The answer is OF COURSE, but it is not tevah, so it will not happen.
Let me try to explain it in steps.
1) If someone (in this case, Someone) knows in advance with absolute, 100% certainty, what I will do, that means, by definition, that it is not possible that I will do otherwise.
2) If it is not possible that I will do otherwise, that means that I don’t have a choice.
3) No choice = no free will.
The l’maalah min hazman approach makes it analogous to someone seeing what choice was (focus on the past tense) made, which does not affect the original choice.
Pizza, chess, what’s next DANCING???????
no need for breaking it down. I understood it but I don’t agree with the concept. For me, the breakdown is “that means, by definition, that it is not possible that I will do otherwise.” I think you are making a leap that does not exist. If you are telling me that we are told that it is so, I will accept it. But I see it as an illogical conclusion.
Sam2 –
It certainly is not awful. I did not say (or imply) that Hashem’s knowledge is limited. Just because the analogy breaks down, does not make it Kefira. No analogy can be True. In the final analysis, it is only an analogy. The purpose of the analogy is grasp two aspects of Bechira in a simple,quick way.
What you are failing to see is that humans are limited. Therefore we need to use analogies to compare something we don’t know to something else that we do. The question rationalfrummie is asking is something along the lines of “I can’t motivate myself to make hishtadlus if everything is pre-determined.” I think it is a mitzva to help him with the chess analogy. The Torah itself uses analogies such as when it talks about Hashem’s “Hand”. As a result, there are people (Mormons) who believe Hashem is physical. Does it hurt more than it helps? Apparently, Hashem doesn’t think so.
If you want the Truth, then you are out of luck because you are running up against the limits of human capacity. That is (part of) what the 3-D chess analogy is used for. In order to understand the Truth, you must understand a world where movement can occur in 4 dimensions. (The fourth dimension is time.) This can only be understood by a human by extrapolating the human experience in 3 dimensions to the Olamos HaElyonim which have 4 dimensions. To grasp how difficult this is, try to extrapolate from a 2 dimensional chess board to a 3 dimensional chess board. In 2 dimensions the pieces are designed to look the same from either side of the board. Does this mean that 3-D chess pieces must look the same from all six viewpoints? If so, what are their shapes? Would each major piece be protected by 5 pawns (Each pawn protecting from one of the other players) – or would the pawn be shaped like a half bagel and cover 5 squares? Is it O.K. for 5 players to form an alliance to defeat the sixth player?
Basically, the 3-D analogy shows that using extrapolation we can’t get an accurate picture when done from 2D to 3D, and therefore it’s logical to assume that it doesn’t work from 3D to 4D either. The Truth is unavailable to us about Free will. We CAN understand enough to be motivated to play the “game” of life according to the rules that Hashem has given us by making a proper hishtadlus.
For instance, rationalfrummie’s question about Rosh Hashanna is answered by the concept of Hashem’s will being conditional. The Gezeira is not you will get z dollars. The gezeira is if you do x mitzvos, you get y dollars. But if you do x/2 mitzvos, then you will get y/3 dollars. (Hopefully everybody understands by now that this is an analogy and the Truth of what is in the Gezeira can not be understood by humans.)
Can you really digest the notion that it is 100% certain that I will do X, yet it’s possible that I will do Y?
That does not make sense (assuming, of course, that X and Y are mutually exclusive).
Think of it as two people eating pizza while playing chess and dancing.
no, you are connecting two things again that dont connect. I am NOT saying that it is 100% certain that you will do x yet its possible that you will do y. I am saying that my *knowledge* of what you do has NOTHING to do with your decision making process. Period.
But I just showed you how it does, because otherwise there’s a paradox.
no,you didn’t show me it does, you TOLD me it does, but it doesn’t.
and its not a paradox just because you say it is.
I am NOT saying that it is 100% certain that you will do x yet its possible that you will do y.
Of course you’re not trying to, but that’s the paradox which your disconnecting the two presents.
I am saying that my *knowledge* of what you do has NOTHING to do with your decision making process.
If that knowledge was merely 99.99%, you’d be correct. But since His knowledge is 100%, it does force the decision, because any decision to the contrary would be impossible, because it would be a paradox.
you can restate it 100 times, i still disagree. i am not misunderstanding your point and in need of clarification, i am disagreeing. they are mutually exclusive.
and its not a paradox just because you say it is.
No, it’s a paradox because it’s logically inconsistent to say that it is 100% certain that I will do X, yet it’s possible that I will do Y.
Maybe we should try a popcorn analogy.
you can restate it 100 times
73 to go.
they are mutually exclusive.
Now you’re starting to get it. (Don’t you just love when I twist your words).
thats just you repeating yourself again. what I am saying is closer to – I am 100% certain you will do x though it was POSSIBLE that you would do y. Your free will takes place in your head. your choice takes place in the physical world. I know what will be, but you still had a choice.
now you will insist again that it is a paradox, and i ill say agan that i see no contradiction so maybe this is beyond pointless.
I was bored tonight so I picked my Rivash off the shelf. I opened up to a random page and his T’shuvah (1:118) is about this precise issue. His answer was that Hashem’s knows our possible options and how we will use our Bechira in those options. I’m not sure how it answered the question.
I am 100% certain you will do x though it was POSSIBLE that you would do y.
By switching to past tense, you avoided the paradox. This is the approach of the “lmaalah min hazman” approach.
Keep the whole sentence in future tense. Then it doesn’t work.
Syag: I’ll tell you why you’re viewing it wrong. It’s because Hashem’s knowledge is categorically different than ours. Knowledge, in Hashem’s terms, equates with absolute existence. The proper chess analogy would be someone who has only 1 legal move. The piece will not move until he moves it, but there’s no real Bechirah. That’s what Hashem’s knowledge is like. Which is why it’s a paradox.
Another analogy. Will you take the train or the ferry to Manhattan tomorrow? You don’t know (yet) and neither do I. But it is surely only one of them, and we will both (if I stalk you) know tomorrow.
Let’s say you pick the ferry (good choice!).
Even today it is true that you are going to pick the ferry. We can’t know this, but it is the fact. However, it is a truth about your choice. Your choice is forever, in that sense.
This is essential to understanding why being above time makes a difference. When someone hears that Hashem is above time, he can say, “Well I’m not, and if He knows what I’ll do then it’s decided already.” Therefore, the above is a first step to understand this.
DY – still makes sense to me in future tense, i put it in past tense to simplify it for *your* understanding 🙂
Sam2 – I believe you are limitiing Hashem and I am not. That is why i dont accept your presentation.
Haleivi – do i sense someone is agreeing with me, or simply helping me out? Thank you. though i wont be anywhere near manhatten on my day off, i like that explanation.
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