Vice President JD Vance took the unusual step during the spring and summer of personally contacting senior U.S. military commanders across the Middle East, Europe and Asia, seeking their individual and unfiltered assessments of the Iran war before those views were consolidated into a broader Pentagon assessment. The conversations gave Vance a considerably more sobering picture of the conflict than what top administration officials were publicly presenting, The New York Times reported.
Among the most serious concerns was the strain on critical American weapons stockpiles. Commanders told Vance they were deeply concerned about dwindling supplies of Patriot interceptors, which form a key part of U.S. air defenses. By late spring, one theater had fewer than 100 Patriot interceptors remaining. That theater had also exhausted its supply of Army Tactical Missile Systems, which can reach roughly 190 miles, as well as its stocks of Precision Strike Missiles, their intended replacement. Stocks of critical munitions such as those were the lowest the commanders had ever seen.
Vance’s discussions went far beyond weapons supplies. He sought commanders’ assessments of the war’s objectives and tactics, casualty estimates, Iran’s intentions regarding the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran’s ability to adapt to the fighting and how much punishment the Iranian government could withstand. He also asked how moving additional weapons to the Middle East would affect America’s ability to deter China, Russia and North Korea.
The assessments made clear to Vance that Iran was prepared to absorb extraordinary losses in its fight for survival and that limited U.S. defensive weapons could complicate efforts to stop Iranian retaliatory attacks while simultaneously responding to threats elsewhere. As the war dragged well beyond the roughly six-week period Pentagon planners initially budgeted for the campaign, commanders watched with alarm as their munitions stockpiles continued to dwindle.
Vance had opposed the war from the outset, at times arguing against launching the operation directly to President Trump during meetings in the Oval Office and Situation Room. Once Trump made the decision, Vance publicly defended it. Within days of the war beginning, however, Vance began seeking additional briefings and information directly from commanders, telling colleagues he wanted more granular information to better advise the president.
President Trump had initially expected Iran’s government to collapse within days and had not seriously contemplated the war lasting long enough to significantly strain U.S. stockpiles. By April, as it became clear the conflict was not proceeding as hoped, Trump authorized a team that included Vance, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff to begin seeking a framework for negotiations with Iran aimed at ending the conflict while leaving the country’s authoritarian government in power.
Vance incorporated the lessons from his conversations with commanders into private discussions with Trump and the president’s inner circle. The commanders who spoke with him included Admiral Brad Cooper, who commands U.S. forces in the Middle East, as well as officers in Europe and Asia. Admiral Samuel J. Paparo Jr., the head of U.S. Pacific Command, was among Vance’s private interlocutors and brought experience directly relevant to Iran from his previous command of naval operations across the Middle East, Red Sea and Persian Gulf.
The calls were made with the knowledge of President Trump, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and White House chief of staff Susie Wiles. Pentagon and White House officials disputed any suggestion that the process reflected a breakdown in communication, maintaining that senior officials and commanders remained in regular contact and that the president and his team had access to military assessments.
(YWN World Headquarters – NYC)
