The Big One,
1. I don’t know, but it is not my place, or yours (unless you have given him a farher), to presume that he is not. I know nothing about the Rabbi mentioned in the article other than that he is a well known posek and Rosh Yeshiva in the Mizrachi community.
2. You are missing my role in the two positions. With respect to the Jewish murderers I was not giving my own opinion, I was explaining a possible basis for someone else’s opinion. With respect to the Arab murderers I was giving my own opinion. If in fact the Israeli government follows the recommendation of Rabbi Levanon, I would hope they would execute the Arab murderers too.
3. I am going to intersperse my responses. You wrote: “Just as you indicated the punishment could be applied even where it didn’t meet all the technical legal requirements for its implementation, the same principles applies in the crime I used as an example.”
That is just it, the same principles, as I explained above, do not apply to the crime you used as an example.
“I submit, perhaps subconsciously perhaps not, it is due to the current secular societal environmental views of how good or bad each of these two sins are, that leads you to these two different conclusions.”
There is nothing subconscious here. The way the Gentiles will judge us, or not judge us, is a factor in the Chillul Hashem that allows for such executions outside of normal halacha.
“As far as it being a c”H to punish those committing that crime, that is clearly not the case. It cannot be a c”H to enforce Torah Law just because secular society considers it to be a mitzvah something the Torah considers to be of the worst (and a capital) aveiras.”
You are ignoring the fact that Torah forbids us from punishing those that commit that crime. There are two rare exceptions that allow a Jewish government to execute someone even though the Torah forbids it under normal circumstances: (a) Chillul Hashem where the Gentiles say that the Jews are gravely discriminating against non-Jews; and (b) where the leaders are afraid of an aveira getting out of hand and they seek to nip it in the bud by executing someone who committed the aveira in public.
The rationale I was providing in the case Jewish murderers was (a). In response to your question about mishkav zachor was explaining why I believed that neither rationale applied.
“As you well know, the crime I cited is now widespread, a condition traditionally cited in halacha justifying executing beyond the letter of the law.”
The justification is when there is a fear that it will soon be widespread, not that it is already widespread. Fakert, Chazal say that once murder became widespread the Sanhedrin left the lishkas hagazis so as not to have to execute people.
“Furthermore, executing the Jewish teenagers would also not stop murder yet you didn’t let that bother you in not citing that as a reason against executing them.”
Once again, the rationale I was providing in this case is not based on murder being widespread, or even the fear that it might become widespread, but rather to prevent the Chillul Hashem that would result from the Jewish murderers being let off lightly and to creat a Kiddush Hashem showing the world that we treat crimes against non-Jews with the greatest severity.