“Firstly, as I pointed out, if the hit was not hard enough to make sense that it killed him, everyone would be patur. So we are talking about a full fledged hit”
No. Not at all. You’re confusing levels of intent when mistakenly causing a death: reckless, negligent, and no liability accident.
If someone hits hard enough to kill, it’s ALWAYS reckless. He must realize that such force COULD kill, therefore it’s irrelevant whether he actually MEANT to kill. The Gemara opens the Perek with the example of a person tossing a stone over a wall into a public area, killing someone “by mistake”. He is considered to have killed recklessly (karov l’mezid) even if he truly didn’t mean to. He does not go into exile — he is liable to death bidei shamayim (and maybe Malkus, and maybe death by royal decree – opinions are split). A father who hits hard is not exempt, even if he claims “chinuch”. Everyone is liable here.
On the other extreme, no liability accidental death is where there is no intention to kill, nor is the death foreseeable from the person’s actions. The example in the Gemara is tossing a stone into an empty private courtyard, when someone breaks in and the stone hits and kills him. The thrower did not intend to kill, nor did he act negligently. Obviously this applies to parents, whether engaged in chinuch or not. Everyone is patur here.
The middle category, and the one we’re talking about, is negligent manslaughter. Here, the person did not intend to kill, was not grossly reckless, but the consequences were foreseeable. This is a very narrow situation. The example is a person chopping wood and the ax head falls off. Chopping wood is not necessarily a dangerous activity, but apparently ax heads were liable to come flying off. So if the chopper did not take care to clear the area, if he kills a bystander by mistake, he is liable to exile.
The exceptions to negligent manslaughter include a parent hitting child. By DEFINITION, the hitting has to be NOT hard enough to cause serious injury i.e., non-reckless. It has to be a situation like the ax head — something not dangerous in and of itself, but could foreseeably lead to serious harm.
The father is exempt even if he wasn’t hitting his child — any activity in which he’s engaged in chinuch but is slightly negligent will be excused. Example: while teaching son to chop wood, ax head flies off and kills son. Father is exempt, though a normal person would not be. The reason they speak about hitting is to include not only indirect causation, but direct causation as well.
However, father is not exempt if he wasn’t engaged in chinuch (eg, he falls off a ladder onto son) – then it’s just regular shogeg, and exile. He’s also not exempt if he wasn’t negligent – ie, if he hits too hard. A person is never exempt if they hit too hard. He’s also not exempt if he claims “chinuch” but can’t actually show that the activity was proper chinuch.
“Secondly In the context of teaching a career or swimming as the case may be, you are correct
However the first Mishna is talking about learning that’s why the father and Rebbe are together.”
It appears to be the opposite— Rava separates out the father to show that his defense is broadly construed for all areas of chinuch. A rebbi has the defense only to the extent of his teaching. What other mishna speaks about a father’s exemption from exile?
“And the passuk in mishlay that the gemorah brought is pretty pro hitting not just in a few scattered out instances”
You must acknowledge the purpose of Rava bringing this passuk here, now. The Gemara is not in the middle of discussing parenting techniques. It’s a purely legal discussion about criminal liability for death. Rava is making an effort to explain why the Mishna gets a father off the hook for well-meant but negligent education. He’s trying to construe the defense as broadly as possible (as opposed to the defense for the rebbe, or the messenger of bais din, which are more limited). He accomplishes this with the passuk in mishlei. This serves as a defense bidieved, but there’s no reason to see it as a directive l’chatchila. It’s also not an absolute defense — it’s just a presumption that if a father was engaged in chinuch, he was acting with good will. This can be disproven.
I think the word “mitzva” is throwing you off. Sometimes mitzva means “mandatory”, and sometimes it means “baseline acceptable” (think the machlokes about eishes yfas toar). Here, it’s probable and at least possible that it means “acceptable”. Follow the logic from Abba Shaul and the wood chopper and you’ll see this. Again, you can’t remove the passuk from the context of the Gemara, which is a legal defense against criminal liability, not parenting class.
Think of those horrible cases CV when a well-meaning and generally responsible parent leaves a baby in the car, and it passes. Courts may look for any exemption in order not to press charges, because what additional punishment could a parent possibly need after inadvertently causing the death of his child? This is not to say that such behavior is an example of model parenting.
The passuk on its own is subject to much broader interpretation. (As you know, when the Gemara quotes from tanach, it is often seeking a very specific drash of the passuk, not the literal meaning.) Literally, יסר means to chastise. It doesn’t mean “to hit”. The pshat in mishlei is that it’s good to discipline your child —but it doesn’t say you must hit. Mussar is a way of life and can and should be very gentle. In fact, the baalei mussar that I know raise one eyebrow, and their children get the message. According to them, if a parent has to resort to hitting, they’re clearly failing on the mussar front. An eyebrow should be enough.