To add on to Daas Yochid’s comment:
Jewish parties can also, of course, voluntarily contract around many halachik rules (provided they do not violate the law of t’nai al ma shekasuv b’Torah, which will require precise language in the contract, as well as some substantive restrictions on what can be done), and Beis Din will then be obliged to enforce the terms of the contract.
Contracting around halacha and incorporating State or Federal law into contracts between Torah-observant Jews is not uncommon, and is entirely reasonable when the parties generally run their businesses in accordance with secular law regulations. Complying with one system of law in some dealings, and an entirely different system in other dealings is inefficient, complicated, and sometimes unworkable entirely.
As a side note, this kind of case provides a great example of what I was saying before – how issues raised in the study of secular law can inform understanding of the application of halacha. If a Beis Din is in the position of enforcing a contract incorporating , for example, New York law, how does the Bais Din proceed? Do the dayyanim research the New York case law in order to accurately reflect the current State of New York law? If so, how can they do so without significant knowledge of the secular system (obviously they can employ lawyers as experts, but that raises a host of other issues, since different practitioners of New York law are likely to have different views on any particular question)? Perhaps the dayyanim should work off the New York statutes, ignore the case law, and interpret the legislation themselves? These are all issues that are dealt with extensively in secular law, and which are, to my VERY LIMITED knowledge, are not dealt with in traditional halachik literature. If not for my study of American law, such questions would likely not even occur to me in my study of Choshen Mishpat.