Lomed Mkol Adam-
1) I was proving from the possuk “V’Uhavta L’Reiacha Komocha” that a natural emotional feeling can be considered “good” even though the essence of emotions is self serving.
Again, even if as you say the Torah is referring to the emotion, it is the circumstance which makes it good. A different circumstance would render that same emotion not good and unhealthy. Ergo, the emotion is not inherently good.
If the Torah considers natural feelings of love towards another Jew a “Mitzvah”, then kal v’chomer it can be classified in general as “good”.
Additionally the Derasha of Chaza”l on the possuk “V’Hulachta B’Druchuv”-“Ma Hu Rachum Af Atu Rachum” pashtus means to infer to the actual characteristic trait of “compassion” unrelated to deeds. So the Torah considers the actual characteristic trait of “compassion” not only “good” and a “mitzvah” but even a following of the ways of God.
No, that is not the pashtus. The pashtus is that we cannot attribute any emotion to Hashem, and if he is called merciful it is because he acts that way. Similarly, a person should act that way. Furthermore, of course there are times when to be merciful is wrong as well. Which again shows that it is not inherently a good trait.
Any rule which has even one exception is not absolute. Saying something is inherently good is the same as saying it is absolutely good. If an emotion, even in only one case, is not good, you cannot say it is inherently good. That is all I am saying.
2) a) the obvious reason why Beth Din should try hard to find fault in the evidence, is because of compassion for the guilty person; the same way Avrohom Avinu plead with Hashem to withhold punishment from Sidom even though they were deserving of the punishment.
If you were correct, then legal arguments should not be necessary to let the guy off the hook. There should be no reason to have to claim ??? ????? ??? ???. You should just be able to argue the morality clause and get him off the hook. Clearly the halacha does not recognize these feelings.
b) This would seem to infer that the Tanna did not approve the behavior and would obviously not do so himself.
d) it’s obvious that my explanation of these two separate stories is the simplest explanation which explains both stories the same way.
???? ???? ?? ??? ????? ?? ???? ??? ?????? ??? ???? ????? ?????? ???? ????.
What is the context of this statement? Well, just beforehand the Gemara says:
????? ?????? ????? ????? ??? ??? ???? ?????, ???? ??, ???? ???, ????? ???? ?? ???? ??? ?????? ??? ?? ??? ?????? ???? ????, ??? ???? ???? ????? ????? ???? ???? ????? ?? ??????, ???? ???? ?? ??? ????? ?? ????…
Next-
Here are the words of the Rambam:
????? ???”? ????? ????? “????? ????” ???????? ??? ?? ???? ????? ???? ???? ????? ?? ???? ????. ??? ?????? ???? ?? ???, ??? ?????? ?? ????? ????? ??? ???? ????? ??? ?? ?????. ?????? ??? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ????? ??????? ???? ???? ??????? ????? ???? ?????? ?? ??? ????? – ???? ???? ????.
Also, the Meiri is known for his position that ????? ???”? does not apply to civilized non-Jews, but that is a different story.
In the Zohar it says that many animals/fish carry ‘gilgulim’ of lost nishomos which need a tikkun; and the way they get a tikkun is through a Tzaddik shechting and eating them. This is how I understand why the Tana’im ate animal meat.
Nevertheless we see in the Gemara that Rabbeinu Hakodosh was reprimanded for not showing sufficient compassion for the animal which was being led for slaughter.
Yes, but he was not reprimanded for allowing it to be slaughtered. Moral of the story? Have as much compassion as you can have without it infringing on you enjoying your steak.