TheFakeMaven

Chabadshlucha: According to what you have just written, it is quite clear that you are quoting Derech Mitzvasecha the first five chapters of Mitzvahs Emunas Elokim. However without knowing for instance Mitzvahs Hatfillah it is impossible to know what he means with Hashems names and the Sefiros.
Furthermore, although you correctly differentiated between the two mitzvohs, your application seems rather faulty. Emunah is Sovev, by definition Sovev has NO connection to us (that we can feel) as the Rashab explains beautifully in Heshach 5772 part 1. The Sefiros that you are reffering to is in Memalah not Sovev.
Another point, you explanation of Hashems seems to be contradicted by the Rashab Hemshech 5766 pages 200-260 (in the new edition).

laskern: Think for a minute, if I have two options, both of them good, one of them is obviously better than the other (99 percent of the time). Both the Ultimate Good and the Merciful one will want the option that is the better one, and in that case there is no difference between them.
In other words Both the Ultimate Good and the Merciful one want the exact same outcome and the choice would always be the same.

laskern: Again, you haven’t addressed my point. According to your definition, there is no difference between the Middah of Mercy and the Middah of Judgement, since both of them seek to give to each individual what is truly best for them. For instance, there are two options for person X, option A) which is the best thing for him to actually happen (even if it may be a punishment), or option B) which is not as good.
Hashem, being ultimate Goodness would choose option A), and Middas Harachamim, wanting to do what is actually the best for this person X, would also choose option A). Therefore there is no difference between them.

As to Meschet Beitza, it has absolutely no relevance to this case. Everyone agrees that the actual pronunciation is with a tzaddik, rather the MA (O”C 156) says that for different reasons one should say Beiah.

So, according to your reasoning, Hashems essence comprises of at the minimum A) Mishpat, B) Goodness. Thus you have successfully made a case that there is a plurality in Hashem c”v; i.e. his essence is comprised of at least two parts. How is this in line with what we know that Hashem must be פשוט בתכלית הפשיטות?
[someones essence is what he is בעצם]

laskern: So you are saying that Hashem is משפט, and decides what is ‘correct’ after hearing the argument of דין ורחמים?
Is Mishpat the essence of Hashem, or is it a characteristic of Him? (By essence I mean, for instance the essence of a Human is that it has a soul, So is Hashems’ essence Mishpat, or is it just instantiated in Him?)

Laskern: It means that the mercy and the judgement agree to the action.
So tell are these two attributes, A) part of Hashem, or B) outside of Him?
If A) then you are saying there are ‘parts to Hashem, mercy and judgement, if B) then you are saying that Hashem does not reward or punish himself.

Laskern: There is a distinction between saying that לשבר את האזן is to help us speak about Hashem proper, as you and AviK are doing, as opposed to what I am saying, which is, that in regards to Hashem proper we cannot speak of at all, there are no words to describe Him at all, [see Guide 1:58], rather anything we say is as apophatic theology, (see Guide ibid).
Speaking in any positive way of Hashems ‘wants’ ‘likes’ ‘desires’ etc, is simply wrong and touches upon the issue of הגשמה. This is why the Mekubulim took great pains to say that they are referring to the Sefiros NOT Hashem proper (see any Kabalistic sefer [usually by way of introduction] written by the Rishonim, for instance, Mareches Elokim, Avodos Elokim, etc,).
As such, (as daas Yachid rightfully points out) according to your understanding, saying Hahsem bestows goodness because he likes too, is a tautology, it adds nothing to our understanding of the WHY Hashem bestows. It is a description of a description, Hashem gives good because he gives good, since even you agree that Hashem doesn’t really ‘want’ anything.
[As an aside, this is not what צמצום means. צמצום is a concept first revealed to us by the Ariza”l, whereas לשבר את האוזן is concept that has already been in use since the times of the Geonim].

Avi K: Exactly my point. Did you learn the parts preceding what you quoted? Hashem does not “want” anything, does not ‘need’ anything. Furthermore, Hashem has no ‘will’ which we can speak of. All we can do (at least according to Rambam), is say what Hashem is NOT. (See part 1:50 and further, see also Kuzari 1:4 what the philosophers say).
laskern: Which is why one can’t say ‘because he enjoys giving’. Humans enjoy things, not Hashem. Just pause for a moment and think: enjoyment is an inverse relationship, i.e. if one gets pleasure from one thing, than he can also get displeasure. Saying such a thing on Hashem is tantamount of saying Hashem has ‘moods’. Remember, Hashem is NOT a person.
(The sources that I gave are an approximation of where it should be, since I was writing this from memory)

Interesting question, although I think it is based on two false assumptions.
Premise A) Hashem created the world in order to bestow ultimate goodness to those that adhere to the correct path.
Premise B) Whatever the correct answer to the question of free will, ultimately Hashem still foresees the future.
Thus being that He wants to only bestow good, (A), and he ‘knows’ that this person would under his own free will not be a recipient of it, on the contrary, he will be punished, (B). Why did he create them?

On the face of it, premise A needs clarification on multiple levels of analysts. The phrase תכלית הטוב להטיב, is given as a cause for the creation of the world, i.e. the ultimate ‘goal’ of a supremely good being is to bestow goodness onto others, thus He must create the world for that end. However it doesn’t explain why we need to ‘work’ for this good, why couldn’t Hashem just give us the ultimate reward without the hardships need to acquire it? That is why we say נהמא דכסופא, i.e. by definition a complete reward is only one that we worked for and deserve it. This in a nutshell is the rationale behind the Ramchals opening remarks.
However, on the face of it, if we think into this it would seem that the reasoning is flawed. First of all, why do we need to say that Hashem is the ‘ultimate good’? Presumably because if he wasn’t, then it would take away from his Omnipotence (שלימות). But doesn’t saying that since he IS the ultimate good, and that means bestowing onto others ‘goodness’, that in itself takes away for His שלימות? Think about this way, if he would NOT have created the world, He would not have unto whom to bestow ‘goodness’ thus He would be missing in שלימות, as תכלית הטוב להטיב, that would then mean that His שלימות is DEPENDENT on others, c”v.
Furthermore, this would imply that insofar that the world was not in existence, (i.e before בריאת העולם), and there was no one to ‘favor’ then he was at least at that time, missing in שלימות c”v.
Another point would be that we know that Hashem is פשוט בתכלית הפשיטות, how can we attribute to him middos and wants? Only humans are capable of such things because we can change, not Hashem.
If this is incorrect, and his שלימות is not dependent on actual bestowal of ‘goodness’, (thus His שלימות is NOT dependent on others), then why did He need to create the world at all? (Which was the reason of stating תכלית הטוב in the first place).
Thus we can safely assume that we are lacking in understanding what תכלית הטובל להטיב means.

As to the premise B). The general understanding is correct. The question of free will is not asked as such: since we have free will, how can Hashem know the future, rather it is always (to my knowledge) phrased like this: since Hashem knows all that is going to happen how can WE have free will. In other words the question is on OUR free will, not on HASHEMS’ divine knowledge.
The difference of phrasing imply that whatever the answer, what is constant is Hashems knowledge of the future, whereas if it would have been phrased the first way, that would imply that Hashems divine knowledge might not be constant. Obviously the reason for stating it the second way is because Hashem must know the future for if not it would be taking away from his שלימות, (and another reason which is tied into this one).

Now we can answer the OP question. The concept of תכלית הטוב cannot mean in regards to the initial reason of creation, as explained above, rather it refers to the moment in time when the attribute (Sefirah) of Chesed was created. Then we can say that whatever is created through the Sefira of Chesed (which in this case is the world in general) was created in such a way as to be able to give full and complete Chesed to its inhabitants. However we are not referring about Hashem proper c”v, since He Himself does not have any attributes whatsoever.
But, in regards to free will, that is not talking about the level of the sefirah of Chesed, rather of a higher dimension, one without time. Thus the question why did he create wicked people knowing full well that He would not be able to bestow goodness to them, is incorrect, since the ‘knowing’ and the ‘wanting to bestow’ are two different dimensions.

Bshtei_Einayim: I guess we can take it that you agree that the מהרשד”ם and the Radvaz disagree with you, and that you misspoke. Furthemore it is a well known fact that the Posek Hador of the generation of the Rezhiner Rebbe,, the Mahsham did wear techeilis (according to some versions every day), and so did many other Gedolei Hador such as R’ Itzekel Ponivizer. It seems that when it comes to a דאורייתא these Torah luminaries deemed it necessary to be חייש. I personally do not think myself better than them that I too shouldn’t be חייש.

Moreover, I find it very telling that although I have given you ample sources in explanation of how I reach my conclusions, you have given us none. You say ‘Mesorah mesorah mesorah’, yet from where did you receive such a מהלך? The aforementioned Poskim do not agree with you, yet you have no source for your opinions? And why should I or anybody else listen to your opinion of כללי הפסק when you give no source for it?

Bshtei_Einayim: So I guess you agree that the מהרשד”ם Radvaz and more disagree with you, and that you misspoke. Furthermore, as is well known the Posek Hador of the previous generationm the Mahrsham wore the Rezhiner Rebbes techeiles, and so did many other such as Reb Itzele Ponvitzer. It seems that when it came to a דאורייתא they were חייש (as I have previously written). I don’t put my self over these Gedolim and I too would like to be חייש for a דאורייתא.

The underlying thread of all these ‘Mesorah’ arguments seem to stem from a lack of understanding of כללי הפסק. It is quite telling that although I have given ample sources to where I got my opinions from about how we go about an halachic inquiry, your only comeback has been with ‘Mesorah Mesorah Mesorah’, without ANY source for your opinion!

Bshtei_Einayim: Our primary mesorah did not change from human to printed sefarim….
It would seem that you never looked into the opinion of the printed seforim themselves, see שו”ת מהרשד”ם C”M 1, Radvaz 6:2147.

Bshtei_Einayim:

Neville ChaimBerlin: Also, a video of Reb Chaim saying “if you had the real techeles you should wear it” as proof? Come on…
I think you missed my point with that. All I stated was that if R’ Chaim really learns (only) nignaz kepshuto, then it is impossible for ANYONE to be able to find it since Chazal definitely knew what they are talking about. Yet R’ Chaim did not tell the questioner that he must be mistaken as it was nignaz kepshuto. Doesn’t that sound like R’ Chaim understands that nignaz CAN be learn’t both ways?

As to your first comment, I beg to disagree, Iv’e spent over a year on this topic and have gone through virtually every pamphlet, as well as listened to numerous shiurim from both sides.

anonymous: “The commentator here FakeMaven is bordering on kefira. To say that if any Rishon holds there is no techeiles nowadays should “wrap it up”, is heresy. We don’t talk about Rishonim in that tone.”

Please explain to me how is it disrespectful to say that a Rishon is so holy that no Achron can argue on it? I was under the impression that those that belittle the Rishonim and say that they are nothing special are the ones being disrespectful, not someone who places the Rishonim above and beyond anybody in our generation.

And the agenda of such a writer is obviously not coming from Yiras Shomayim.
Completely irrelevant. An argument is independent of its originator. If you have something of substance to say in regards to the points made up until now, say it. Bashing people is not productive to anything.

And the way he talks about the majority of Gedolim who are on the opposing side is extremely disrespectful.
Please quote the relevant places where I may of inadvertently been disrespectful of any Gadol. I am unaware of where I went wrong and would like to learn from my mistakes.

anonymous: Iv’e gone through the relevant parts in Daas Noteh and have NOT seen the Mahril addressed at all. Kindly share with us where it is mentioned.

As to the rest of your remarks, they are again quite ridiculous, you seem to have a problem with conflating issues. What relevance does the correct shiur or talking during davening have to do with techelis? You don’t attack the ARGUER only the ARGUMENT. WHO says something has no bearing as to the WHAT that is said. If you have nothing what to answer to an argument attacking the messenger of the argument doesn’t destroy the reasoning.

But for the fun of it: I actually go with a size 24, I fully agree that talking during davening is a terrible thing and B”H I don’t do it. As to the zman of krias shma, the Shulchan Aruch Harav disagrees with you.

And the best for the last, about nipitz leshma. For anybody that is an Ashkenazi and follows the Rema, המנהג להקל בניפוץ, (O”C 11) . I therefore do not have the audacity to say that for us nipitz is nothing more than a chumra.

daass torah: There are those who argue, but any one rishon that says nignaz is a halacha shoiuldnt wrap up the whole mitzva, becouse there is a broader world out there.

Please name me one Rishon that clearly says nignaz means literally.

[It seems that the participants of this thread are unaware as to the status of the sefer Daas Noteh, and seem to think that R’ Chaim penned or authorized it. In fact the sefer is not from R’ Chaim rather someone compiled a bunch of answers al pi hashmuah, furthermore, the footnotes are an addition that everyone agrees is not from R’ Chaim.

As such, the sefer carries no weight in a halachic discussion since we do not know the exact question and answer, nor the context it was said in].

BMG: To answer your second point first. We do what the Shulchan Rules, which is to those that can understand a sugya themselves should follow what they understand. (See Y”D 242). [As is quite common, your mixing up a hashkafa question with a halachic one]

R’ Eliyashiv was refering to people as yourself that have never gone through the sugya, as ybl”c R’ Chaim told R’ Karp, a talmud muvhak from R’ Eliyashiv, that since he learnt the sugya and feels it is the correct techlis he IS mechuyav to wear it, even though his Rebbe held not to/

Furthemore R’ Eliyashiv himself states that he never went through the metziyos of the Murex. [See in the letter to R’ Feivel Cohen, and as R’ Karp his talmud muvakh says clearly in regards to the letter].

anonymous: As I stated in the first post, what is said about R’ Chaim Kanievsky is hearsay and carries no weight in a halachic discussion. Furthemore R’ Chaim Kanievsky does say clearly that if one is sure it is techeilis he is mechuyiv to wear it (see the enclosed link). Also please enlighten me as to how such a statement is not against the Mahril.

As to the Chazan Ish, again that is hearsay, and more importantly he was referring to the cuttlefish.

The Bais Halevi: If you mean the version that was actually written down, i.e. that if it was always known etc. then it is simple why it is not said of the Murex. And if you mean the version that is a Berisker bemesora, being that I am not a Brisker I am not beholden to accept their stories, especially in this case, as A) the Reziner who was corresponding with him quotes it differently, and B) the second version makes no sense whatsoever, since there is no place other than the kashuras of fowel that we need a mesorah.
As to the Rambam, again I refer you to my first post where I stated that the Rezhiner Rebbe says with clarity that there is no such opinion in the Rambam.

[video src="http://techeiles.org/viewer.php?filename=debate%2F%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%91+%D7%97%D7%99%D7%99%D7%9D+%D7%A7%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%91%D7%A1%D7%A7%D7%99%2FHarav+Chaim+Kanievski+www.techeiles.org+.mp4" /]

Bshtei_Einayim: Realize that you haven’t disputed my point at all, and you must agree that the Rishonim do not understand nignaz in the sense that you were implying. Furthermore, no posik would argue against a Rishon thus we can safely assume that the argument of nignaz is based on false assumptions. Therefore, unless you can tell me of a different way of learning the Mahril, no contemporary posek can dismiss it. (And in truth, no big Gadol has argued about nignaz other tha HaGaon R’ Chaim Kanievsky, and that is hearsay, which carries no wight).

So I don’t think I need to convince you of anything, the facts speak for themselves.

We’re all sort of speaking over each other. We must first define A) what does ‘holy’ mean, B) what makes something holy. After we have these defined it should be rather simple to see if yiddish is or is not holy.

`Dear Burnt Steak,
Let me first start that you have an extremely valid point. I can personally relate to you, at least in yeshivah. I had, to put it mildly, an extremely disappointing experience their with all of the hanhalah. however, I soon came to realize that you cannot judge a religion by its practitioners, rather by its creed. If its creed itself is the one that call for amoral behavior, then you can call it corrupt, if however, the religion in itself is not, rather some of its practitioners are, then it is not an issue with the religion, rather with the population.
I would strongly encourage for you to learn seforim such as Chovos Hatilmudid and Hachsharas Avreichim, for a glimpse into what the real world of Judaism is all about. It may change your life. I know it did mine.
Wishing you the best and clarity of mind to make the right decisions.

The years old statement is actually a big machlokos achronim, there are some that say that after twenty you do get an oinesh for what you did from thirteen.

We are all forgetting what Chazal say in פסחים דף נ’, לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ובמצות שלא לשמה, שמתוך שלא לשמה באה לשמהת the של”ה says that although it is actually an aveirah to learn שלא לשמה, it is impossible to achieve lshmah without first learning shlo l’shma.

This is all besides the point for there are two seperate discussions going on here, which for some reason is being jumbled together. The first point is What is the ultimate goal, and that is l’shma, not for schar. The second point is: How do we reach such a level, and that depends on the person. For some its schar, and for some it’s the oinesh.

dafbiyun: seriously, a taalis sheilah does not need tzitztis.