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n0mesorah: The cornerstone of theistic religion (to exclude some forms of Buddhism) is a personal God i.e. an omniscient and omnipotent God, and free will i.e. reward and punishment. To claim the contrary seems to me be equivalent of saying that Deism (as it was incepted) is congruent with Judaism (or Christianity for that matter). Hence denying any of these two pillars of faith, one denies the basis for any form of religion. I fail to see how one can defend the contrary. (I do not think it necessary to give sources for such a basic principle, however I’d be happy to provide them).
As to Rabbi Chisdai Cresces, I think you might have misunderstood him to the extreme; God forbid to call him a determinist. In a nutshell, R. Cresces moves free will from the action to the emotion of the action, and hence reward (at least in the afterlife) from the actual performance of the commandments to the attitude one takes towards it. [The exact view of his is still subject to scholorally debate, however it is not germane to our discussion]. Therefore, R. Cresces is by absolutely not a determinist.
MaskilDoresh: Thank you for you kind words.
urs
As far as scripture as literature, the whole idea of sacred literature on all three Abrahamic religion is its immutability for generations. I do not understand the point you are trying to make.
n0mesorah: As I am unsure of which article/book you recently perused in regards to Herder, but the term noun and verb in this context is wholly unhelpful. Where for Spinoza God had two attributes, and both were static (hence the ‘noun’), for Herder God had one attribute in an infinite expression. This attribute was in line with the ‘vitalistic’ mode of being, similar to Leibniz’ Monads, (hence the ‘verb’). However, by necessity, this God too is impersonal, and although unlike Spinoza it did not preclude a teleological cause there was still no freedom of choice.
Hence, a personal God and free will was denied by default through Herders philosophy. Clearly ‘philosophical apostasy’.
Furthermore, by reading holy scripture as literature there is a denial of metaphysical truths inherent in scripture, for it is naught but a creation tied to the time and place of its inception.@n0mesorah: One more point as to Herder. He himself acknowledged that his ideas of religion, greatly influenced by Spinoza, were not orthodox in any sense of the word. And he would be considered by any religious authority as an apostate. See his ‘Letters’ v, 29, 90-91.
@n0mesorah: 1) “It wasn’t publicly realized until Spinoza’s philosophy was being openly debated. At that point, all the early philosophers were dead.”
This is demonstrably false. Spinoza’s Ethics was translated into German in the year 1677 and came under constant and unrelenting attack ever since. Virtually every professor of theology or philosophy wrote an attack against him and he was known as Satan himself. For an overview of this see Grunwald, Spinoza in Deutschland specifically pgs. 45-48. Thus, the debate on Spinoza actually predates the enlightenment. Furthermore the first generation (or at the minimum early) of Enlighteners, Kant, Mendelsohn, Herder, Jacobi (and thus Lessing) and many more directly attacked/interoperated Spinoza. In short, Spinoza was always actively engaged in Germany.2) I am referring to the fact that it originated in Germany, the birthplace of Protestantism.
3) a) Leibniz was not strictly an enlightener, furthermore which Leibniz are we referring to, published or unpublished works. One can scarcely consider an adherent to the Monadic theory a strict empiricist.
b) Mendelsohn. As mentioned above, first of all he was a Wolffian, and his Morgenstudatten is not exactly a piece of enlightenment philosophy. Furthermore Mendelsohn’s opinion on reason on faith and Judaism was not accepted in the secular establishment. His above referenced Morgenstunden is perhaps the last Wolffian philosophical work written. This just further highlights my point made above, that Mendelssohn’s view of the ideal of the enlightenment were not congruent with the secular ones.
c) Herder. Kant’s broadside on Herder was exactly that. Herder was reverting to pre-enlightenment ideas of reason and postulating ‘Vitalistic’ ideas which were not empirical. So, in sum, yes, these philosophers were not enlightened in secular understanding.@n0mesorah: Two points: If I read you correctly you are trying to say that the German Aufklarung never had Judaism in its crosshairs. That is factually incorrect. There is a reason why the enlightenment first dawned in Germany, and only after the protestant revolution. Furthermore, the ‘enlighteners’ attacked every religion that relied on revelation. Again I refer you to the Jacobian affair.
Although obviously not possible to say definitively, probably on par with what it was before the enlightenment. The main catalyst for assimilation was not technological progress per se but was rather the emancipation which was solely an enlightenment idea. Modern scholarship has shown that before emancipation it was close to impossible for a Jew to be able to be integrated into the general population, I point you for instance to Endelmen, Leaving the Jewish Fold, Princeton University Press among others.
From your lack of criticism of anything I surmise that you concur with my previous post?
@n0mesorah: that is incorrect. Judaism as understood by the secular Aufklarung was antithetical to what religion was according to them. A ‘clerical’ religion is a political system, and one which is not in line with any form of political philosophy espoused by any of the enlightenments, be it the German, French or British. It is as if saying Hobbean political theory is commensurate with a Lockean view of the world. As a general rule political philosophy is subservient to ones’ metaphysical view, of which Judaism and the Enlightenment were at odds.
The Jewish enlightenments goal, however, was simply to rationalize Judaism, and in that sense was not innovative. This was a project which had been undertaken for a least two millennia, as is evident by the descriptions given by Philo of the various Judaic views of the first century. Most interesting the ones prone to allegorize the Torah. Hence the united and vicious attack by the Maskilim against Kabbalah. One can consult Graetzs’ history for a Maskilic understanding of the development of Judaism almost like one can consult Hegel’s for an idealists interpretation of history.
Does that make one an apostate? That is besides the point. The discussion is not so much if a jew such as Mendelsohn ‘yano yain nesach’, the question is rather if the outcome of the Maskilic movement would lead to apostasy, which seems to have been the case.
[To answer your barb however, first off I have never stated that Mendelssohn himself would not be considered a religious Jew, the Yavat’z seems to have considered him as one. Secondly it all depends on ones definition of religious. If one denies Kabbalah is he an apostate? Shadal obviously did not believe nor the much more esteemed R’ Aryeh de Leon before him. We do believe this. If one denies the concept of Gilgul does that make him an apostate? Again depends on whom we ask.
The problem is that Judaism did not articulate exactly what beliefs make one a believer. But again, all this is besides the point.]@Marxist @nomesorah: The term ’emancipation of Jews’ as was used by the philosophers of the nineteenth centuries are anti-Semitic in essence. There is a marked difference in the goal of the Jewish ‘enlighteners’ vis-a-vis the broader enlightenment project. Where for Mendelsohn and the Berliner group Enlightenment ideology was a form of separation of Church and State, for the secular enlighteners it was quite different.
Mendelsohn was more or less an observant Jew, and was espousing a form of integration, he was however a firm believer in making a religion a private affair as he famously puts in Jerusalem. The Jewish enlighteners were very much for rationalizing religion.
However, for the secular world, the culmination of the Enlightenment was a revolution of religion as a whole, and in which there was no place for Judaism. Let me contextualize this. It is telling that the early Jewish Enlighteners were more aligned with the Wollfian school of classical metaphysics, and not with the ‘Copernican revolution’ proposed by Kant. (Maimon being a noted exception, although he was not a typical Jewish Enlightener). [And the later Jewish Enlightener were at the most Neo-Kantians, think Herman Cohen]. The reason why this is of note is because it is precisely the insistence of Kant’s Transcendental Metaphysics, which relegates religion to nothing but the adherence to “Categorical Imperative” which is a frontal attack against Judaism and all that it stands for. A ‘Clerical Religion” vs. an “Ideal Religion”. The infamous Jacobian Controversy would be a historical case study.As for the comments on Sartre being a founder of Existentialism, even if one were to grant him this dubious title the criticism is way off mark; especially the critique of Kierkegaard. If anything this would be a critique of Phenomenalism which is a system of epistemology not existentialism. As Kierkegaard, who is actually considered to have laid the groundwork for existentialism, puts it an objective truth can also be experienced and become a subjective truth. In other words, Kierkegaard never denied objective truths, nor is there any room in any of his arguments to interpertate this. Rather all he does is add another layer to truths, through experience. This does not in any way negate objectivity in any way.
If one wants to blame postmodernisms subjectivity blame it, however absurd, on Cartesian in its’ radical forms such as Berkeleyan Idealism. Or perhaps on the critique of Kant’s ‘Thing in Itself’….Marxist: you seem to be equating emancipation of Jews as not an anti-Semitic idea. The concept of ’emancipation’ comes from the Enlightenment, and is a very much against religion as a whole. Arguably the foremost Enlightenment philosopher, Emanuel Kant greatly admired Mendelssohn but disparaged Solomon Maimon, not for lack of knowledge, but rather because he viewed Maimon as a backwards Jew.
By suggesting that Jews need to be emancipated, they are implying that Jews as Jews are not tolerable. That is antisemitism.Without getting into too many details, the misunderstanding happened because of an equivocation of the concept עצמותו ומהותו. Outside of Chabad the term means God Himself, i.e. His essence, and that is how the term was always understood, by the Jewish philosophers. Thus when, for instance, the Rambam wrote God is unknowable in essence rather all that we can know is his existence, he meant that all we can know is ידיעת מציאתו ולא מהותו. [In regards to what the Rambam calls God שכל פשוט, he does mean a mind like ours, as he clearly states in direct opposition to Aristotle].
It is precisely this point that the Maharal takes up with the Rambam, God is unknown in every sense and way and cannot be spoken of at all. A consequence of this was that even in Gods’ interactions with his creations is a secondary manner (I am not referring to השגחה, rather to the knowledge of Him). For instance according the Rambam we can know God negatively, i.e. via negitiva, but according to the Maharal we can’t). Following in his footsteps it became common practice not to speak about God Himself in a direct way, meaning all we can know is a roundabout way, סובב, that God, so to speak, ‘takes care of the world’, however anything pertaining to God not as He interacts with the world, ממלא כל עלמין, we can have absolutely no knowledge about. The ramifications of this approach in a simplified manner is that our ‘job’ in this world, which is only what we can have a שייכות to is strictly the letter of the law.
Chassidus in general, and Chabad in particular, reformulated the concept of our knowledge of God. Without getting into details, Chassidus teaches that knowledge of סובב is actually a higher form than of ממלא and that a human being can achieve even this level. Chassidus further teaches that there is a difference between אור אין סוף and אין סוף itself. In other words, even as it relates to this world there are many ‘levels’ of Divine manifestations as it pertains to us. How it is manifested and it’s relationship with the physical is a lengthy discussion which we will not get into now, however what is patently clear according to this is that everything, including the physical is אלקות; and everything even רוחניות was created and is not God in the strict sense.
Now, what Chassidus and the Litvishe (for lack of better word) understanding of the Divine Hierarchy have in common is that they do not speak about God himself. However what the God that is unknowable is a dispute as mentioned above. For according the Litveshe understanding Kabbalah through speaking of the Divine Attributes ספירות is in itself a discussion of God that we cannot understand, ממלא; but, according to Chassidus, this is סובב and can be grasped through contemplation דעתא עילאה (at least by the ‘higher souls’). עצו”ה according to the litvishe is God himself, according to Chassidus we never discuss God himself, rather these are all forms of emanation that pertains to us.
To sum it up. No one believes that we can speak of, let alone grasp, God Himself. The issue at hand is rather what is the Zoher speaking of, God Himself or rather סובב. Therefore there is always an equivicotion between the terms used in Chassidus and the Litvishe, and do not mean the same thing. When the Lubabitcher Rebbe said that a Rebbe is עצו”ה he did not mean God HImself as a Litvishe would understand it.
Clearly you misunderstood… That may very well be, so kindly elaborate.
As to your second objection: you seem to misunderstand the meaning of ועמך כולם צדיקים which is referring to the נפש אלוקות which every jew had, and is therefore אלקות. But by a Tzadik even his גשמיות has been refined.
@Shauli
If part of a conceptually infinite being (אין סוף) [as opposed to an indefinite infinity] was ‘separated’ from the rest, that which was separated will contain in it all that it had originally. Thus a ‘part’ (חלק) can be no different than from where it originated from.
Therefore all your points would seem irrelevant, since all you are proving is just that it is ‘part’ not the ‘full’ thing; but you admit to it being ‘part’ of אלוקות ממש, (unlike your original objection).
As to the Avos, see the Shefa Tal there where he draws a parallel between every Jew. But furthermore we are talking about Tzaddikim.
@Shauli
Tanya second perek: חלק אלוק ממעל ממש.
The Ramak in Pardes Ramonim: וענין האבות מעלה גדולה מהם שאינם איברים אבל הם כל עצם האלקות המתפשט אל התחתונים.
Shefa Tal in the introduction (also quotes the Ramak): והנשמה הוא חלק אור וניצות שנחלק מהאור הגדול ברוך הוא וברוך שמו.A few points to keep in mind when discussing this.
1) What is the definition of עצמותו ומהותו, don’t forget, that in Chabad אור אין סוף and אין סוף are distinct entities. I.e. define מכוסה and מופלא.
2) What does it mean that ever נשמת אלוקות is a חלק מאלוק ממש, emphasis on ממש.
3) Regarding point 2, how can there be many ‘levels’ of נשמות if they are all אלקות.Answer these points then you should have a clearer understanding of the topic.
It is not an issue. Amirah LeAmirah is allowed.
That is the difference between ממלא וסובב.
NonPolitical: Was your last post a parody of a logical argument?
Again you write words, yet say nothing, it’s quite the talent. Saying that a certain argument is a parody does not make it neither unsound nor invalid. If you see a fallacy in the argument call it out specifically; otherwise I think it fair to say that you actually have nothing to say.As to getting into tzimzum, no I do not expect you to, what I do think that anybody that actually knows what they are talking about would do, would be to be meramez berimizah. [Not what you said before, which is completely meaningless].
I see a certain pattern emerging as this disagreement goes on. The more I elaborate on why what your saying is incorrect, the less you actually say. All you do is say this is incorrect etc. without providing any arguments. Please try to actually say something of substance in the future, otherwise I don’t think it wrong not to answer unsubstantiated claims.
NonPolitical: Simple. Since, according to both of you the NH did not rely on any novel Chassidic sources, rather any quotation are like a sima bearuvah, then obviously the only issue with Chassidus can be its novelty which is false; otherwise why place them in a cherem.
In other words:
A) Chassidus was place in a cherem, two options, 1) for good reasons, 2) for bad. Obviously for 2.
B) Chassidus was either 1) novel, 2) old news. Obviously 1, for if it was 2 then what’s the issue with it. (Novel meaning what was not thought of before).
C) Chassidus was a novel concept, 1) a completely new approach, 2) it has some new concepts, but is mainly old. (The answer for this one is a little longer, so please bear with me).
Claim: the NH has Chassidic ideas in it. A claim which was agreed upon by both you, since your claim is that although the NH says ideas that seem Chassidic the truth of the matter is that he actually took it from the same origin as Chassidus. So, our point of contention is if the NH is based on Chassidus. I claim option 1, it is a new approach, therefore, since the NH states some Chassidic ideas he must have based it on it. You claim option 2, that Chassidus has some old ideasm and for that it would not have been put in cherem (B, option 2), and the NH took those ideas, but they were put in cherem for B option 1.
Now, since Chassidus was place in a cherem for its bad (A) novel (B) ideas, {both of you seem to say that Chassidus is an invention}- and even the NH that has some Chassidic sources doesn’t take it from Chassidus (C) then obviously no talmudei HaGra held there was any truth to it, for if not, why put it them in cherem.As for the rest of you rebuttal, saying I won’t get into it is more or less an admission, so thank you.
Joseph: You’re opposed to discussing halachic questions that are directly addressed in the S”A?!
Of course not, I’m just opposed to ignorant people making false claims as facts.As to what the S”A paskens: If you’re truly interested you can look it up yourself, E”H 1:10.
NonPolitical: To make this so that you too can follow along I’ll be short and straight to the point. (For reasons that would be clear at the end, I’m starting from the bottom up)/
1) We have not made any claims. You made a claim (or rather expressed a fanciful delusion).
Wrong. Both of you seem to claim that A) Chassidus is an invention (in the strictest sense), and B) no talmudei Ha’Gra held that it’s novelty had any truth to it, on the contrary it was put into cherem percisely for it. (As to my claim, see number 3). According to any interpretation of the English language this is called a ‘claim’.2) Much like you have interpreted the English language in a novel way.
If you are referring to ‘invented’, all I can say is that if you can’t refute it then as far as we are concerned it is true.3) You keep repeating this ridiculous claim like a broken record without giving even one coherent example to back yourself up. And no, saying the word “Tzimzum” doesn’t count as a coherent example, sorry.
I have already given you a source to look up my claims, (see also in the publication Heichal HaBesht many instances where the NH quoted exclusive Chassidus). [As for Tzimzum, see 3:7, and Likutei HaGra at the back of Sifrei DeTzuaseh].
If you are intellectually dishonest or too lazy to look these up yourself, then we truly have nothing to discuss, as it is quite obvious then that you are not interested in the truth.Joseph: About the CRG, I’m very disapointed in you, (or rather, this confirms my suspicions…). Your question is addressed openly in Shulchan Aruch. As Iv’e told you countless times, before writing some silly point, make sure you know what you are talking about.
DaasYachid: Sounds like a new testament, the way you describe it.
Seriously! The NT is not a novel way of interpreting the Torah, it quotes some, changes most, and makes away with it. [I will not quote any of it for obvious reasons]. Chassidus interpenetrates the Arizal in a novel way, much like the the Arizal interpenetrates the Zohar in a novel way.
To sum it up, neither you or NonPolitical have actually quoted anything to substantiate you claims, whilst I have answered any point, regardless of its merit.Daas Yachid: Where did chassidus get it from?
Same place that the Arizal and Rashbi did. [I am NOT comparing the Besh’t with them, that is not in my place]. They are new novel ways of understanding Kabbalistic concepts even for the layman that Hashem revealed to the Besh”t, which is why you do not find these interpretation anywhere else.
NonPolitical: First off, thanks for not answering me directly, it speaks volumes…
Second of all, I understand perfectly the premise, but again both of you seem to miss the point. The term invented in this discussion has two meanings, 1) a new idea or concept, one that is not based on any earlier idea, 2) an addition and/or improvement to an earlier concept. However the Gr”a understood Chassidus, whether as an entirely new movement or an addition to the Arizal, he was against it, and further, there are no Chassidic concepts in his works whatsoever, nor are there any interpretations of the Torah and Chazal that parallel Chassidic ones.
However, with the NH one encounters a completely different story. Not only does the NH quote extensively from Chassidic sources, at times he even deviates from his Rebbe the Gr”a in the favor of Chassidic interpretations, case in point Tzimzum. In fact the only place that the NH does not agree with Chassidus is in Shaar 4, (and the Yesodai Ha’Avodah was written in response to it). In other words, however R’ Chaim understood Chassidus, either as entirely new movement or as an addition, he actually had no issues with it whatsoever other than one aspect, (which was not the driving factor of the Gr”as’ cherem).
To sum this up for those that need Cliff Notes, However the Gr’a viewed Chassus he had an issue with all the core tenets, whereas R’ Chaim his talmud had only one issue with it.Again, study the relevant texts before commenting.
DaasYochid: That only makes sense if you think chassidus was invented, not if it’s just restating what’s already in the Torah.
In that case there should and should not have been any disagreements about Chassidus. [And if you mean to say that the parts that the NH writes like Chassidus is not because he takes it from them, rather because it is pashut peshat in Chazal, In that case you missed my point. The NH interpenetrates many passages in the same context as Chassidus, where it is not found in any other source only there.]
As to the Rashbi and the Arizal not being put in Cherem, that is completely irrelevant, as the question was why did Chasisidus need to “invent” something new. To that the answer is that it is the same invention as Kabbalah in general, (i.e. not an invention at all).
Nonpolitical: Obviously, he relied on chassidus. It’s not like his Rebbe the GR”A was familiar with the Zohar and Kitvai HaAri, he needed the Baal HaTanya to explain it to him. Nebech.
Spoken like someone who has never gone through the NH nor the Tanya. The NH is not Kaballah rather it is based on Kabbalah, the same as the Tanya (and Chassidus in general). And as is the case with anything that is based on something, there is a hermeneutic that predisposed any interpretation; this is what I meant by saying the NH is based on the Chassidus. If you would like to see exactly the extant that he based it, there is a new NH that just came out which endeavors to show the general sources (not strictly Chassidic ones) of the NH. If you would go through it you will many novel interpetaions of the NH are actually taken from early Chassidic texts. So unless the NH was mechaven to chassidis by himself he obviously took it from there. (At the minimum there are many places where he deviates from the Gra himself, e.g. 3:7).
{In the future before making away with what someone says, make sure you check your facts)ModernMisnagid: You seem to be very confused as to whatthe chidush of Chassidus is. Tell me, did R’ Shimon need to ‘invent’ Kabbalah? Did the Ariza”l need to add to an invention? Chassdus invented things the same way the Ariza”l did; i.e. it is not an addition rather it is how to each and every Jew can understand Kabbalah in a practical way. The Nefesh HaChaim is very similar, and in fact relied heavily on chasidic interpretations (at least in the first three gates).
There are a few differences between Chassidus and non-Chasidus as to how to understand a few major ideas of Ariza”l, which do translate to difference in hashkafah. However the Chassidic masters had the utmost respect for their contemporaries. For instance the Baal HaTanya never once spoke against the Gr”a, on the contrary he forbid it. Their were Chassidim that did things that were not condoned by Rebbes, but that was and is not Chassidus.For some reason people seem to be conflating two issues. First off you cant judge a movement by the actions of its adherents rather by the actual philosophy it teaches. Does Chassidus preach that one is supposed to daven after the zman? Does Chassidus say that one should eat before davening? Of course not. And those that bring up the Cherem have obviously never read the actual Cherem as its printed.
And let’s not forget that their were many Rebbes who would put any Gadol alive today, such as the Ba’al Hatanyah, Chidushei Rim, Sfas Emes, Divrei Chaim, R’ Tzadok Hacohen etc… All their minhagim were and are based on Halacha.nonpolitical: I would really like to respond to your comments, but since you didn’t say anything yet I guess I’ll need to wait. Sigh…..
It seems that there is confusion with hashkafah and minhagim. Hashkafah is a derech in avodah, of how one should go around with achieving their tafkid; this can be changed. Minhag, although not all things actually count as one, pertains to halacha, not pure hashkafah, that cannot be changed simply. Waiting one, three, or six hours is not an hashkafik issue rather an halachic one.
Joseph: One is not allowed to change mesorah where it pertains to minhagim, however regarding hashkafa there is no such thing as following in your fathers mesorah. No one (unless he knows your shoresh haneshama) can tell you which path of avodas Hashem is the best for you. Ultimately hashkafa is just another way of saying how one can grow in avodah, and since everyone is different, what worked for you parents may not necessarily work for you. Since none of us are big enough to actually forge his own path we must follow a path already made, however, which one can be different for each individual.
laskern: No, that was not my intention. The person, that you are is the Nefesh Hasichlias, who has two other ‘souls’ the Nefesh Elokis, and the Nefesh Habahamis. In the NH”E there are many levels, but the Nefesh Hasichlias is not on a higher level per se.
As for Fraud, the concept of tri part soul is a concept clearly expressed in the Greek writings. But I don’t see the Nefesh Hasichlias there at all….
A person has three souls, נפש הבהמות, נפש אלקות, ונפש השכלית. You are the נפש השכלית, the other two start the thought processes, נפש אלקות for עבודת ה’ and the נפש הבהמות for tavah etc. The נפש השכלית has three modes of actualizing it’s thoughts, Thinking, speaking, and acting, these are called the Levushai HaNefesh.
There are currently two Mishna Berura style seforim on Even Haezer, Mishnas Haezer and Even Berura. Both are pretty good and a lot more compact than the Otzer Haposkim (although they can’t take its place). However both are not holding too far in, and it seems that it will be quite some time until they are completed.
There is one other one that I know of that is on most of Even Haezer, I never used it but I have flipped through it and it seems to be extremely concise which may actually suit your need more.
As to a kitzur, recently there was a sefer that came out on Hilchos Kiddushin which had a kitzur in it designed for chazara, I don’t know which Halachos your learning so I’m not sure if that would help you.
Not Mishna Berura style there are quite a few.*which Simanim
Actually their are a few, depending on what simanim you want.
square root of 2: Not quite. I think it would be more practical to break down your argument in a more syllogistic form and answer it thus.
You question:
Premise A) Hashem created the world in order to bestow the ultimate good.
Premise B) Hashem knows ultimately that certain people would not be able to receive this good.
Conclusion (question) C) Therefore, why did Hashem create those people.Before I get to my answer, I think it prudent to clarify these points. In the statement of premise A lies some hidden propositions. First of all, THIS is the reason why Hashem created the world from the start. Secondly, the Ultimate good referred to here means the reward in the world to come which cannot be a “free gift”. Premise B implies that regardless as to HOW Hashems’ “knowing” that someone would not turn out righteous, and will therefore not be deserving of the Ultimate Good; this knowing does not take away his free will to act as he wishes.
AviK: Actually that is not what the CI says. First of all, he wouldn’t go against all the Rishonim (see Rambam Mitzvah Asai 1 and Ramban there). Second what the CI was explaining was the practical differecne between Emunah and Bitochen; he says that since we believe (the mitzvah of Emunah according to the understanding of the Rishonim) the Hashem is omnipotent, then all he does is for the best. That is rule (or in his words the halacha), the part which is le’masah, is bitachon, when one is tested.
Square Root of 2, Chabadshlucha: What I’m saying is that although the Ramchal does in fact say that is the purpose, he does not mean it as THE purpose. Let me explain. We find at least three reasons in Chazal why Hashem created the world, of which one of them is because Hashem wanted to bestow goodness. But in order to say that, one must say that Hashem must have created the world, for if the תכלית of the Ultimate Good is to bestow, if He doesn’t than he dis lacking in shleimus, which is why he created the world. However obviously one cannot say that about Hashem, whatever He does MUST be of his own free will, for, if not, then he is not omnipotent. What then does the Ramchal mean?
The answer lies in what the Tikunei Zohar says, אנת הוא ממלא כל עלמין וסובב כל עלמין. What this means is, that there are two ways of how Hashem runs the world, one is in a ‘revealed’ way, the other hidden. Chazal tell us מה הנשמה ממלא את הגוף כך הקב”ה ממלא את העולם. With this expression they are teaching us a profound lesson, which ties in with the two Mitzvohs of Emunah and Yedias Hashem.
The fact that Hashem exists is something which can be proven through logic. Just as that a person has a soul which is his consciousness is something all must agree upon, for otherwise there is no “I” or ‘you”. I think, therefore I am, i.e. if “I” can think than the “I” must exist. However, we can’t see this “I”, yet we know it exists because we can FEEL it. In other words sense perception, (what we can sense with our five senses), is not what tells us what is reality, it is not our eyes that see, rather it THROUGH our eyes we see. There is a whole world which we can’t see but we can feel, and in truth that is what really exists. The ‘I’ (i.e. our soul) is what sees and interacts with the world through the body. [Obviously this is a very broad topic, but I hope this would suffice].
Now, we know that the soul exists, however we do not know what it truly is, we know the concept, but do not know the substance of it. The same is true with Hashem, we know that he exists, the same way we know that the soul exists. Moreover we can even “feel” him much the same way we feel our soul. This is called ממלא, and is what Chazal meant by מה הנשמה ממלא וכו’.
However the same way that we know of the existence of the soul but not its substance (מהות), the same is true with Hashem on a deeper level. Although we can truly ‘feel’ and ‘connect’ to Hashem, that is only on the level that he has ‘decided’ to ‘lower’ Himself down to our comprehension, (which, in a much abridged version is what is meant by [one of the] Tzimtzum); however, on the level that he did not and does not let us ‘feel’ we cannot relate to him at all. Although his omnipotence says that He HImself is everywhere, we cannot “feel” this. We believe it to be true because that is what Hashem has told us through the Torah, but that is all that we can know until Moshiach comes.
These two ideas, ממלא וסובב correspond to the two aforementioned mitzvohs, Emunah and Yediah. The mitzvah Yediah does not mean the knowledge of Hashem which can be known logically, rather the outcome of this knowing, in other words “feeling” Hashem; which is why it is called “Yediaas Hashem” from the word Daas which means connection. This connection only a Jew can feel because of the Nefesh Elokis that only Jews have (which is a discussion in its own right). So, although a gentile can know logically the concepts of ממלא, the outcome of it which is what the mitzvah of Yediaas Hashem is, they cannot ‘feel’.
The mitzvah of Emunah is refering to ‘part’ of Hashem that we too cannot feel (until Moshiach will come). However, the highest level of our soul can feel it, but we on this world do not, which is what the definition of סובב is.After this introduction we can understand what the Ramchal means, with the addition of one more point. Hashem could have created the world in any way he would of wanted, yet he chose to create the world the way we currently have it. Why? The real answer to this is: We don’t know. Simple. The reason is, that knowledge, (i.e. our ability to reason) is in ITSELF a creation, therefore any question that transcended the creation of knowledge itself is completely unintelligible to humans.
So for which ever reason Hashem ‘decided’ to create the world the way we have it. He did this by creating exactly Ten Sefiros, not more not less. If he would have created a different amount then the world would be completely different than we have now. Each Sefirah is unique. Now Chazal tell us that originally Hashem ‘wanted’ to create the world with Din, i.e. the Sefirah of Gevurah but then decided to create it through Chesed, Olam Chesed Yabonah. Now the question of WHY Hashem decided to create the world at all is not addressed here at all, rather all it is saying is when Hashem, for whichever reason, decided to create the world he did it through Chesed.
Now we know that Chesed is the ultimate Goodness, on this we can ask a simple question, how can we say that Hashem created the world through the Middah of Chesed (not that HE is Chesed, since Chesed itself is a creation), there is so much suffering and pain in the world, why not give everyone a free ride?. For this reason we say that since תכלית הטוב להטבי, and if the reward would be ‘unearned’ it wouldn’t be pure Goodness. In other words since the world was created through pure Goodness, we must understand how what we see is actually set up that way; but it is not addressing the question of WHY it was created that way to begin with.
Now, all this is in regards to ממלא, we can feel all the above. However the question of Bechira touches on Sovev, it is something we cannot understand because we cannot feel it. But, by definition, if it doesn’t interact with us, it doesn’t affect us either, as only what does interact with something can affect it. So even though there is for Hashem a Yedia of what will transpire, since it doesn’t interact with us, it doesn’t affect us and therefore does not affect our free will at all, this is known as ידיעה עילאה. [admittedly a hard concept and deserves elaboration for a different time]. But ידיעה תתאה, which is what sustains the world and interacts with it, is what is meant by saying תכלית הטוב להטיב, and in truth, being of a lower level than סובב, since it is IN each and every being according to THEIR level, has in truth no knowledge of the future.I hope this clarified my meaning somewhat.
There are many facets to this topic. Broadly speaking I think we can separate them into two categories, Hashem Himself, and our connection to Him. I’ll address the second one (first). According to your understanding, we can connect to Him on two levels, A) through ‘imitating’ His attributes, since it is using the same Sefiros (Tanya part 1 ch. 2-3). B) Through emunah which is unique to us Jews. You further correlated these two concepts to the two mitzvohs, Yedias Hashem and Emunah. “Knowing” Hashem by definition can only be actualized by things that we can envision, whereas emunah is believing in Hashems ‘essence’ something that no human can actually “know”. (It is this point which is the first category that I mentioned above).
There are a few points which I think you have misunderstood. Let’s start with the connection through ‘imitating’ His attributes. As mentioned above, you equate this with the mitzvoh of ‘knowing Hashem’ and you further claimed that in this regard the gentiles can also ‘know’ Hashem. I think you have a fundamental misunderstanding of what the Torah means by וידעת היום, והשבית אל לבבך וגו’, this mitzvah of Yediah does NOT mean simply understanding through logic (which is what a gentile can do as well). Furthermore I believe that this misunderstanding is why you also misapprehend what the mitzvah of emunah is.
The Tzemach Tzedak in mitzvahs Emunah ch. 3 explains what yediah actually means. In truth, the Tanya states this all the way at the start in ch. 3, and in Torah Ohr Mishpatim the first Drush. In a nutshell, all three of the first three Sefiros (Chabad), are unique. Chochmah and Binah are the intellectual faculties, i.e. what we use to actually reason with, however just knowing something does not change a person in the slightest. It is the third Sefira, Daas, which does this. Daas is what the person uses to connect his knowledge with himself.
[The Rashab in hemshech 5772 part 1 explains it succinctly. A person may know that a certain food or item is good, however as long as he doesn’t take HIMSELF into the equation, i.e. which is good for him, his knowledge of the item would not cause him to do anything about it].
Knowing the omnipotence of Hashem in all its intricacies, does not do anything for the person, he stays the same as he has always. However when he goes to the next step through meditating on these concepts and how they relate to HIM, that changes the person.
Now let’s take this a step further. What happens through this meditation, and why it effectuates a dramatic change is because through this we can actually ‘feel’ Hashems presence. To elaborate on this point would take up too much time, so a brief explanation will have to suffice for now. Because the Nefesh Elokis is made of the same ‘substance’ of (a certain level of) Hashem [this point needs serious elaboration for a different time], it is naturally drawn to Him, however the physical world prevents it from ‘connecting’ to its source. However, as the Baal Shem taught (that is what the Tanya means in part 2 ch. 1 see Likutei Sichos 29, p. 26) all physical entities’ existence is only from the Ohr that lies within it, which is directly from Hashem. Therefore, Chassidus teaches that when used correctly (Tanya p. 1 ch 7-9) one CAN connect to Hashem through the physical itself. But again, this only happens BECAUSE of Ten Sefiros that lie inherently in a Jew.
In other words, the world is full of opportunities to see Hashem in literally everything, as long as it done in the correct way, i.e. to draw closer to him. This ability is inherent ONLY to Jews because of where their soul comes from. Although a gentile may be able to understand (certain concepts) of Yechid Hashem, the next step, i.e. internalizing it, that is an ability ONLY a Jew has. (see Tanya p.1 ch 1, and chs. 18-22).
This, in a nutshell, is what the Mitzvah of Yedias Hashem is.
Emunas Hashem is a totally different mitzvah. It means believing the parts of Hashems’ Omnipotence that we cannot logically understand. And, by definition, being that we cannot understand it, we can also not internalize it in any way that it will change us and bring us closer to Hashem.
AviK: October 29, 2018 1:39 pm, Fake Maven, you are indeed. Your words verbatim. I have actually answered your points. In l”k changing how we USE a word does not effect what it actually MEANS as with all other languages. Thus anybody saying לשבר את האוזן is one hundred percent correct far more than anybody using לסבור since the Hashem intended it is לשבור as all the Rishonim did too. Regardless from how my discussion with deteriorated right from the start, it seems that this will not be a productive conversation at all, and is a waste of time on both of our parts.
Chabadshlucha: I responded late last night after the mods already closed shop for the day. It was a rather long post, but I expect it to be up soon.
StuartW: Thank you for you comment. I hear you loud and clear.
StuartW: Two points, first of all where is your indignation to AviK? Only after his repeated personal attacks against me did I question his wanting a honest discussion or a trading of bards.
Secondly, my points are irrelevant of my character. Either my arguments are valid based on the truth or they are not, my personality is irrelevant to this.Is Daniel written is Lashon Hakodesh?
AviK: Your ignorance knows no bounds! I’m left shaking my head in wonderment at how one can be so ignorant, yet not hesitate to make statements as if they were facts.
Take a look at the first Ran in Mesechet Nadrim where he states the general rule that a language is convention. In other words no language is true or false. For instance if we both decide to call a house chair and chair house then we are just as correct as those that call chair chair. Another way to think about it is that if there would be no humans alive there would also be no language.
All this is said of every other language BESIDES for L”K. Hashem created the world with this language, it obviously predates man, and is therefore NOT a matter of convention. Furthermore, in l”k the words are not merely prescriptive rather they are the ESSENCE of each being (see Tanya part 2 chapters 1, 8-12). It is then also not for us to change since it is not a matter of description rather the essence of each creation. Anybody lumping together L’K with all other languages shows complete ignorance.
Your second point is pointless, what does one thing have to do with another.
As to the third point of ignorance, is the Targam Onkelos L’K?laskern: I cannot say that I KNOW peshat, I have my opinion that I have formulated from I have learnt. But I am always open to hearing others opinions which is why I am questioning you as I am having problems understanding you reasoning.
Chabadshlucha: Since it seems we are both interested in the truth rather than being right, I will gladly tell you (later tonight iy’h when I have the time) which parts I differ from you. If you feel I am wrong or misunderstood you I’m sure you will correct me accordingly.
AviK: From the negative way you write, it is quite obvious that you are not interested in the truth rather you all you care about is being correct. It’s a big pity since it is quite obvious that you of all people are wholly ignorant with matters such as these.
You have totally misunderstood the Shela Hakodosh, and again, before you start typing things, do the research. Lashon Hakodosh can and has NEVER changed. As the Pardes Harimonim (by the Ram”ak) clearly states the difference from L”K and all other languages is that in L”K the word chair is not a description of it, rather the חיות וקיום, of a chair is from the word כסא in L”K. The Shelah HIMSELF quotes it and expounds on it. L”k CANNOT change just as the essence of the world does not change!
[All the SHela means is that in regards as to how WE use words it can change, not the actual language].
And to go correct someone for using a word the correct way as ALL the Rishonim do, and when called out on it cannot be a man and own up to, is an extremely arrogant and abhorrent thing to do.
Be a man and admit to your mistakes, you may learn something one day….