A document authored by the intelligence arm of Hamas helped persuade the group’s leadership to carry out the October 7, 2023, massacre in southern Israel, according to research published this week by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.

The document, written less than a month before the attack and later uncovered during an Israel Defense Forces maneuver in the Gaza Strip, assessed that Israel was not interested in toppling Hamas and had instead adopted a strategy focused on managing the conflict. The analysis was presented to Hamas’s military leadership, including its late leaders Yahya Sinwar and Mohammad Deif, who were subsequently involved in planning the October 7 assault.

According to the published document, Israel had relied for years on preemptive strikes, but the growing strength of Hamas and Hezbollah led it to shift toward short rounds of limited-intensity fighting. The authors argued that after Israel failed to achieve its objectives during the 2008–2009 Gaza war—particularly the goal of removing Hamas from power—it adopted vague objectives aimed at weakening the group without defeating it, prioritizing deterrence and conflict management.

The assessment also pointed to the 2021 conflict, claiming Hamas achieved a psychological victory by linking events in Gaza with unrest in Jerusalem and the West Bank, while inciting Arab communities within Israel.

The document further argued that Israel had failed to fully implement its “war between wars” doctrine and viewed a simultaneous multi-front conflict as its greatest strategic challenge, preferring instead to operate separately in each arena.

While noting that Israel had not abandoned the concept of preemptive action, the authors concluded that Israel was unable to establish a new deterrence framework. As a result, they recommended that Hamas prepare an opening strike that would both trigger a new round of fighting and create an “unexpected” confrontation designed to break established patterns and place Israeli leadership in a state of uncertainty.

The research states that roughly one month after the document was circulated among Hamas’s military leadership, the group launched the October 7 attack, with the assessment playing a role in shaping the decision to proceed.

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