WhatsApp has become so deeply embedded in Israeli life that nearly the entire population relies on it daily. But as its civilian use has grown, so has its penetration into the IDF, creating a massive, unregulated security hole two years into the Gaza war.

According to a wide-ranging investigation by Globes, WhatsApp groups across the military continue to circulate highly sensitive operational details with alarming ease: duty rosters, deployment schedules, recruitment and discharge dates, the timing of classified meetings, movements of units and senior officers, and even photos from the field.

Many of these groups contain hundreds of former soldiers who long ago finished their service but remain active members — receiving sensitive updates daily, without oversight. Some still include civilians who never should have had access in the first place.

The result, experts say, is a treasure trove of real-time intelligence handed directly to Israel’s enemies.

At the start of the war, WhatsApp’s role in IDF operations was chaotic but understandable. Units were scrambling, commanders needed rapid communication, and the app was ubiquitous. But two years later, insiders say nothing has changed.

“Everything flows with remarkable ease,” Globes writes — from the most mundane staff assignments to information capable of revealing an entire operational picture.

Worse, insecure civilian apps like Waze are routinely used to share the locations of bases and units.

Dr. Nathaniel Palmer, a Bar-Ilan University expert on the intelligence of terrorist organizations, says Hamas exploited exactly this type of exposed data ahead of the October 7 massacre.

“In the investigations at Nahal Oz, it was discovered that Hamas planned everything based on information it had stolen from photos on social media,” Palmer said. Tactical details — not high-level secrets — were what mattered: the number of soldiers, the location of vehicles, the timing of patrols.

“There is a crazy gap between what we perceive as secret and what interests an actor like Hamas,” he warned. “I don’t believe claims that classified information doesn’t pass through these groups. The army is run on WhatsApp.”

He adds that the biggest vulnerability is the users themselves. Most soldiers “don’t know what the restrictions are” and “don’t understand what helps the other side.”

WhatsApp accounts are increasingly targeted by cyberattacks, including from foreign adversaries. The prospect of an Iranian or Hamas-linked hacker taking over the account of a soldier — instantly gaining access to sensitive unit information — is “particularly disturbing,” the report warns.

Cyber-risk expert Einat Miron says the situation is already out of control.

“The train has long left the station,” she says. “This isn’t something you can fix quickly. The only thing to do is stop everything and create new rules — which information can be shared and which cannot.”

She notes another alarming trend: former intelligence-unit graduates posting on social media about their roles, team assignments, and areas of expertise while job hunting. Iranian operatives, she warns, “want to build an intelligence picture,” and such posts offer a detailed map of personnel, skills, and potential targets.

The IDF has taken several reactive steps, including banning Chinese-made vehicles from bases, deploying an AI system (“Morpheus”) to monitor soldiers’ public social-media accounts, and moving toward banning Android devices for officers.

But experts say these measures miss the central issue: a complete lack of enforcement and a culture that treats sensitive data casually.

“A good hacker can distill the most trivial information,” Miron said. “Instead of populist bans, we need to update procedures written in 2000.”

Palmer agrees: “The country needs a cultural change. We all share everything all day long. Without legislation from above, nothing will change.”

In a statement, the IDF said it conducts “ongoing risk management, control, and monitoring” of unclassified communication on WhatsApp and stresses the responsibility of soldiers to follow security guidelines. The military said relevant units receive secure devices and undergo information-security briefings.

But the investigation suggests a stark reality:
an adversary does not need advanced espionage systems when Israeli soldiers are unknowingly broadcasting operational information in real time.

As Hamas, Iran, and Hezbollah continue expanding their intelligence capabilities, WhatsApp — Israel’s favorite communication app — may be providing them everything they need, served on a silver platter.

(YWN World Headquarters – NYC)