Israel is failing to protect Yerushalayim from the threat of an October 7–style mass infiltration, leaving vast security gaps along the city’s eastern flank that could be exploited by terrorists, State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman warned in a blistering report released Tuesday.

Englman found that Israel’s political and security leadership have largely failed to internalize the lessons of Oct. 7 when it comes to Jerusalem. Instead, authorities have operated under what the comptroller described as a dangerously complacent assumption: that a similar attack “could never happen” in or around the capital.

“There is a scary narrative in which Palestinians can enter Israeli territory without any oversight or inspection, carrying potential danger for Israeli residents,” Englman wrote.

The report paints a picture of systemic neglect, outdated assumptions, and fractured responsibility among Israel’s senior leadership — from the Prime Minister’s Office and the Defense Ministry to the police, the IDF, the Shin Bet, and the National Security Council. Englman warned that the deficiencies are so severe that they should be “causing the political-security leadership to lose sleep.”

At the core of the warning is Jerusalem’s eastern perimeter, where 39% of the border between Israeli neighborhoods and parts of east Jerusalem and the West Bank lacks any protective barrier. While 61% of the border is secured with fences and obstacles, the remaining gaps include multiple long, exposed stretches, including an 11-kilometer section, a six-kilometer section, a 250-meter opening, and dozens of additional kilometers across other vulnerable areas.

After the report was finalized, a terror attack in the Jerusalem neighborhood of Ramot on Sept. 8 killed six Israelis and wounded around 10 others. According to the comptroller, the attackers came from villages near Ramallah and used precisely the same security gaps identified in the report to enter Jerusalem.

Despite that reality, Englman found that the diplomatic-security cabinet has not held a follow-up hearing on the implementation of its own security decisions in more than 20 years — a staggering lapse given the scale of the threat.

The report also raises alarms about the placement of forward command centers and IDF lookouts responsible for monitoring Jerusalem’s perimeter. Even after Oct. 7, when Gaza-border lookouts were overrun, murdered, and kidnapped, the positioning of similar units around Jerusalem remains dangerously exposed. Englman warned that they could face the same fate if a coordinated assault were launched.

Pressed on whether Jerusalem’s dense geography limits the ability to move lookouts farther back — unlike the Gaza border — a comptroller source noted that modern surveillance technology allows monitoring from greater distances, undermining claims that current placements are unavoidable.

Beyond physical infrastructure, Englman identified deep failures in command and control, operational readiness, and inter-agency coordination, warning that the consequences extend beyond security to Israel’s diplomatic standing and economic stability.

Responsibility, the report said, rests squarely at the top. Englman explicitly named Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Israel Katz, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir, Police Commissioner Daniel Levi, Shin Bet Director David Zini, Central Command chief Maj. Gen. Avi Bluth, Jerusalem and Border Police commanders, and the National Security Council, calling on them to “fix these deficiencies immediately.”

The report placed particular emphasis on the Defense Ministry and the National Security Council, which underwent a leadership change in October when Gil Reich replaced Tzachi Hanegbi.

Checkpoint management emerged as another critical failure. Englman said the police should have taken over more checkpoints from the IDF years ago, since police are better trained for inspection and law enforcement. Instead, progress has stalled. Of the 16 police commanders overseeing checkpoints already transferred to police control, only two hold permanent assignments, with the rest rotating regularly.

In other cases, government decisions to transfer checkpoint responsibility from police to the Defense Ministry have been frozen for years with no explanation. The Defense Ministry has claimed it would need NIS 1.1 billion to assume control — funding that has never been allocated.

The Shin Bet, the report said, has also failed to fulfill its role. The agency should be providing updated guidance and inspection protocols to police at checkpoints, which could both improve threat detection and reduce the daily humiliation and delays faced by innocent Palestinians. Currently, the average Palestinian waits 80 minutes to cross a checkpoint on foot, compared to 56 minutes by car.

Englman accused the Shin Bet of failing to take responsibility, while also faulting the cabinet and National Security Council for failing to issue clear directives to the agency.

The urgency of the warning is underscored by the data. In 2023, there were 27 deadly terror attacks, including 10 shootings, 98 explosive attacks, 412 Molotov cocktail attacks, and more than 1,000 rock-throwing incidents. In November alone, the Shin Bet recorded 232 rock-throwing attacks, 45 Molotov incidents, 24 explosive attacks, and 60 thwarted major attacks.

(YWN World Headquarters – NYC)